Abstract-Attribute-based signature (ABS) enables users to sign messages over attributes without revealing any information other than the fact that they have attested to the messages. However, heavy computational cost is required during signing in existing work of ABS, which grows linearly with the size of the predicate formula. As a result, this presents a significant challenge for resourceconstrained devices (such as mobile devices or RFID tags) to perform such heavy computations independently. Aiming at tackling the challenge above, we first propose and formalize a new paradigm called Outsourced ABS, i.e., OABS, in which the computational overhead at user side is greatly reduced through outsourcing intensive computations to an untrusted signing-cloud service provider (S-CSP). Furthermore, we apply this novel paradigm to existing ABS schemes to reduce the complexity. As a result, we present two concrete OABS schemes: i) in the first OABS scheme, the number of exponentiations involving in signing is reduced from OðdÞ to Oð1Þ (nearly three), where d is the upper bound of threshold value defined in the predicate; ii) our second scheme is built on Herranz et al.'s construction with constant-size signatures. The number of exponentiations in signing is reduced from Oðd 2 Þ to OðdÞ and the communication overhead is Oð1Þ. Security analysis demonstrates that both OABS schemes are secure in terms of the unforgeability and attribute-signer privacy definitions specified in the proposed security model. Finally, to allow for high efficiency and flexibility, we discuss extensions of OABS and show how to achieve accountability as well.
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INTRODUCTION
A TTRIBUTE-BASED signature (ABS) enables a party to sign a message with fine-grained access control over identifying information. Specifically, in an ABS system, users obtain their attribute private keys from an attribute authority, with which they can later sign messages for any predicate satisfied by their attributes. A verifier will be convinced of the fact that whether the signer's attributes satisfy the signing predicate while remaining completely ignorant of the identity of signer. ABS is much useful in a wide range of applications [35] including private access control, anonymous credentials, trust negotiations, distributed access control for ad hoc networks, attribute-based messaging, etc.
However, one of the main efficiency drawbacks of ABS is that the time required to sign grows with the complexity of predicate formula. More precisely, the generation of signature requires a large number of module exponentiations, which commonly grows linearly with the size of the predicate formula [27] , [30] , [35] . Although the traditional desktop computers should be able to quite easily handle such task for typical formula size, this presents a significant challenge for users that manage and view private data on mobile devices where processors are often one to two orders of magnitude slower than their desktop counterparts.
Recently, cloud computing is getting widespread attentions in the scientific community. This new computing paradigm enables convenient and on-demand network access to a centralized pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly deployed with great efficiency and minimal management overhead. Cloud computing has plenty of benefits for the real-world applications [12] , [39] , [41] such as on-demand self-service, ubiquitous network access, location independent resource pooling, rapid resource elasticity, usage-based pricing, and outsourcing etc. In the outsourcing computation paradigm, the users with resource-constraint devices can outsource the heavy computation workloads into the cloud server and enjoy the unlimited computing resources in a pay-per-use manner. Though promising as it is, this paradigm also brings forth some new challenges when users intend to outsource ABS on an untrusted cloud server. Specifically, since some private information is involved in the outsourced signing operation, it demands a way to prevent the untrusted S-CSP from learning any private information of the signer. Moreover, since the cloud service is typically required to be paid in the commercial setting, it also demands a way for the signer to guarantee the accountability on cloud service provider once the signature is not generated correctly.
Our Contribution
In this paper, aiming at reducing the computational overhead at signer side, we propose two efficient outsourced ABS (OABS) schemes denoted by OABS-I and OABS-II. We employ a hybrid private key by introducing a default attribute for all the users in the system. More precisely, an AND gate is involved to bound two sub-components of the user private key: i) the private key component for user's attributes (denoted as outsourcing key OK in this paper) which is to be utilized by S-CSP to compute the outsourced signature; ii) the private key component for the default attribute which is to be utilized by signer to generate a normal ABS signature from the outsurced signature returned from S-CSP. The security of the both schemes can be guaranteed based on the observation that outsourcing key is restricted by the user. In this way, S-CSP can only sign the specified message on behalf of user.
Our first scheme OABS-I is built on Li et al's construction [27] . With the help of S-CSP, the number of exponentiations involving in signing is greatly reduced from OðdÞ to Oð1Þ, where d is the upper bound of threshold value in the predicate. Our second OABS scheme OABS-II is based on Herranz et al's construction [25] . The main advantage of OABS-II over the previous one is that the signature is much shorter since it has only three group elements. The number of exponentiations for signing a single message is reduced from Oðd 2 Þ to OðdÞ after outsourcing. Furthermore, the communication overhead at user side in outsourcing phase is only Oð1Þ. Finally, to allow for high efficiency and flexibility, we discuss two extensions on OABS including accountability and outsourced verification. On accountability, we embed a normal signature of S-CSP in each outsourced ABS signature to allow for tracing the dishonest actions of S-CSP. On outsourced verification, we utilize the technique [38] to build an efficient outsourced verifying protocol for OABS.
Related Work
Attribute-Based Signature
The first formal definition of ABS was presented by Maji et al. [31] . Their construction supports for predicate descripted by monotone span programs, but the security of the scheme is in the generic group model. Li et al. [27] and Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini [35] proposed the ABS schemes that support threshold predicate in standard model. Nevertheless, both of their schemes require OðjV Ã jÞ exponentiations in signing, where V Ã is the attribute set in the threshold predicate included in the signature. And, the signature length of the above schemes is OðjV Ã jÞ, which also grows linear with the size of attributes in the predicate. Escala et al. [17] proposed a revocable ABS for threshold predicate, which shares a similar efficiency with Li et al.'s work [27] in signing. Recently, Herranz et al. [25] proposed two threshold predicate ABS schemes with constant size signatures. But they are both inefficient. The first scheme not only invoking another similar algorithm Aggregate in [15] , but also requires a large number of heavy computations, and the second one involves Oðd 2 Þ exponentiations in signing, where d is the upper bound of the threshold value.
Concerning on more expressive predicate, beyond the pioneering work [31] , Maji et al. [30] instantiate an ABS for the case that the predicate is described as monotone span program. Though it is proven secure in the standard model but is much less efficient than the original one [31] .
Okamoto and Takashima [33] presented the first fully secure ABS scheme in standard model supporting for nonmonotone predicates.
We specify that existing work of ABS requires a large number of exponentiations in signing. The complexity commonly grows linearly with the size of the predicate formula in threshold ABS. 1 Such inefficiency becomes even more serious for ABS with more expressive predicate.
Outsourcing Computation
The problem that how to securely outsource different kinds of expensive computations has drew considerable attention from theoretical computer science community. Atallah et al. [1] presented a framework for secure outsourcing of scientific computations such as matrix multiplication and quadrature. Nevertheless, the solution used the disguise technique and thus leaded to leakage of private information. Atallah and Li [2] investigated the problem of computing the edit distance between two sequences and presented an efficient protocol to securely outsource sequence comparison with two servers. Furthermore, Benjamin and Atallah [4] addressed the problem of secure outsourcing for widely applicable linear algebraic computations. Nevertheless, the proposed protocols required the expensive operations of homomorphic encryption. Atallah and Frikken [3] further studied this problem and gave improved protocols based on the so-called weak secret hiding assumption. Recently, Wang et al. [37] presented efficient mechanisms for secure outsourcing of linear programming computation.
In the cryptographic community, Chaum and Pedersen [11] first introduced the notion of wallets with observers, a piece of secure hardware installed on the client's computer to perform some expensive computations. Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [24] proposed the first outsource-secure algorithm for modular exponentiations based on the approaches of precomputation [9] , [32] and server-aided computation [5] , [10] . Recently, Chen et al. [13] proposed more efficient outsource-secure algorithms for (simultaneously) modular exponentiation in the two untrusted program model.
The notion of server-aided signature [10] , [26] , [28] , [29] has been proposed in order to reduce the local computational cost associated with performing exponentiation. However, such server-aided signature schemes are oriented to accelerating the speed of exponentiation and are not practical for small number of signatures generation. Actually, at a high level, the server-aided signature method can be viewed as a special mediated cryptography. Boneh et al. [6] , [7] on mediated RSA and Ding et al. [16] on mediated group signatures are another two examples in this area. Mediated cryptographic protocols share the feature of utilizing a partially trusted online server. However, they were proposed to provide efficient revocation, instead of using the traditional revocation list method. There are also some other related work addressing the computation outsourcing in one-time signature by using the hash-chain technique [23] . However, these above mentioned techniques cannot be used in ABS to realize OABS efficiently. Furthermore, the notion of accountability on cloud service provider has never been addressed in traditional server-aided signature schemes, which is another critical issue of outsourcing signature in commercial setting.
Another approach might be to leverage recent generic outsourcing technique or delegating computation [14] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] based on fully homomorphic encryption or interactive proofs systems. However, Gentry [19] has shown that even for weak security parameters on "bootstrapping" operation of the homomorphic operation, it would take at least 30 seconds on a high performance machine. Therefore, even if the privacy of the inputs can be preserved by utilizing these generic techniques, the computational overhead of this technique is still huge and impractical.
Recently, the outsourcing technique has been applied to ABE to reduce computation overhead at user side [22] , [41] . In [22] , Green et al. considered to outsource the decryption of ABE to eliminate the overhead at user side, while an outsourced ABE with outsourced encryption and decryption was presented in [41] . We point out that the outsourcing technique in [22] , [41] is to blind user's attribute private key by running a number of exponentiations. But such key blinded operation cannot be straightforwardly applied to reduce the computation overhead for ABS. In this paper, we consider a hybrid policy technique that introduces an additional default attribute appended with each user's attribute set. Actually, our technique provides a feasible way to realize the "piecewise key generation" property recently introduced in [34] .
Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the system model and security requirements of OABS. The first proposed scheme and its security and efficiency analysis are presented in Section 3. We propose the second construction with shorter signatures and its security analysis in Section 4. In Section 5, we provide a thorough experimental evaluation of the proposed OABS schemes. In Section 6, we discuss an extension of OABS. Finally, we draw conclusion in Section 7.
SECURITY MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
Formal Definition
There are three entities involved in our OABS system, namely, the attribute authority, users (include signers and verifiers), and S-CSP. Typically, the signers obtain their private keys from attribute authority, with which they are able to sign messages later for any predicate satisfied by the possessed attributes. Verifiers will be convinced of the fact that whether a signature is from one of the users whose attributes satisfy the signing predicate, but remaining completely ignorant of the identity of the signer. Different from the definition of traditional ABS [25] , [27] , an additional entity S-CSP is introduced. Specifically, S-CSP is to finish the outsourced expensive tasks in signing phase and relieve the computational burden at signer side.
Definition 1 (Outsourced Attribute-Based Signature). An outsourced attribute-based signature scheme OABS consists of five probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms below.
Setupð; U; dÞ: It takes as input-a security parameter , an attribute universe U and an auxiliary information d. It outputs the public key PK and the master key MK. The master key MK must be kept secret. KeyGenðMK; VÞ: The key generation algorithm is run by the attribute authority. For each user's private key request on attribute set V, the private key generation algorithm takes as input-the master key MK and the attribute set V. It outputs the user's private key SK and the outsourcing key OK. The private key SK is sent to the requested user via a secure channel, while the outsourcing key OK is sent to S-CSP via the public channel.
Sign out ðOK; V; ÇÞ: The outsourced signing algorithm, which is run by the S-CSP, takes as inputthe outsourcing key OK, the corresponding attribute set V and the predicate Ç. It outputs the partial signature s part . SignðSK; M; s part ; ÇÞ: The signing algorithm, which is run by the signer, takes as input-the private key SK, the message M, the partial signature s part generated by the S-CSP and the corresponding predicate Ç.
It outputs the signature s of message M with the predicate Ç. VerifyðM; s; Ç; PKÞ: The verifying algorithm takes as input-a message M, the signature s, the predicate Ç and public key PK. It outputs 1 if the original signature is deemed valid and 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, we state that the OABS constructions in this paper support for predicates Ç consisting of thresholds gates. Specifically, all predicates Ç k;V Ã ðÁÞ :! f0; 1g for V Ã with threshold value k from 1 to d are supported, where d is a system parameter and
Security Requirements
A basic ABS scheme must satisfy the usual property of unforgeability, even against a group of colluding users that put their private keys together. In OABS, since a "honestbut-curious" entity S-CSP is introduced, we require that the forger, even additionally colluding with S-CSP to obtain the outsourcing keys of any users, still cannot forge a valid signature with any predicate which his/her attributes do not satisfy. In more details, the formal definition of unforgeability is based on the following game involving a challenger C and a forger F :
Setup. C chooses a sufficiently large security parameter and runs Setupð; U; dÞ. It maintains the master key MK and sends the public key PK to F .
Queries. C initializes an integer j ¼ 0 and an empty table L. F is provided the following oracles:
Outsourcing key extraction oracle. Upon receiving an attribute set V, C sets j ¼ j þ 1, runs KeyGenðMK; VÞ and returns OK after adding the new entry ðj; V; SK; OKÞ into L.
Note: the outsourcing key extraction oracle can be repeatedly queried with the same input. Private key extraction oracle. Upon receiving an attribute set V and an integer i, C just returns SK if such an entry exists in L. If no such entry exists, the challenger runs KeyGenðMK; VÞ and outputs SK after adding the new entry ði; V; SK; OKÞ into L. Signing oracle. Upon receiving a message M and a predicate Ç, C returns a signature s by running Sign out and Sign. Forgery. Finally, F outputs a pair ðM Ã ; s Ã Þ with the predicate Ç Ã . We say that F wins the game if i) s Ã is a valid signature on M Ã with Ç Ã ; ii) for any queried attribute set V 2 U, Ç Ã ðVÞ 6 ¼ 1; iii) the pair ðM Ã ; Ç Ã Þ has not been submitted to the signing oracle. Accordingly, the advantage Adv EUF OABS;F ðÞ of F is defined as the probability that it wins the game above. Beyond the adaptive predicate security, we also specify that the unforgeability under a weaker adversary model named selective predicate. An OABS scheme OABS is unforgeable under selective predicate attack, if there exists no polynomial forger that can win in a modified game, where the challenge predicate Ç Ã is submitted before Setup. To guarantee privacy for the signer, we require that the attribute-signer privacy is preserved as in traditional ABS [25] , [27] . Specifically, it requires that the signature reveals nothing about the identity or attributes of the signer beyond what is explicitly revealed. Following the intuition, we formulize this definition with a game between a challenger C and an adversary A below.
Definition 2 (Unforgeability
Setup. C chooses a sufficiently large security parameter and runs SetupðÞ. Finally give the pair ðPK; MKÞ to A.
Query. C provides the signing oracle, private key extraction oracle and outsourcing key extraction oracle as the above game of unforgeability. 
THE FIRST CONSTRUCTION OABS-I
The Proposed Scheme
Let G; G T be two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order q. Let e : G Â G ! G T be a bilinear pairing. Let D i;S ¼ Q j2S;j6 ¼i xÀj iÀj be the Lagrange coefficient for i 2 Z q and a set S of elements in Z q .
The proposed scheme OABS-I, which is based on the traditional ABS in [27] , is shown as follows:
Setupð; U; dÞ: First, redefine the attributes in universe U as elements in Z q . For simplicity, we can take the first jUj elements in Z q (i. e. 1; 2; . . 
where n ¼ jV Ã j and compute s If and only if it holds, output 1 and accept the signature.
Security Analysis
The correctness is trivial by the following equation:
A critical requirement in delegated computation is to be resistant to cheating by delegatee. Our scheme achieves this by employing the hash function on the concatenation between message and predicate. Therefore, even if S-CSP cheats by modifying signing attributes, the forged signature still cannot pass verification. In the following, we first introduce some problems in G.
Definition 4 (CDH Problem).
The computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is that, for every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, there exists a negligible function neglðÁÞ such that Pr½Að1 l ; g; g x ; g y Þ ¼ g xy neglðlÞ for all l, where x; y 2 R Z q , and g is the generator of a group G of order q, which is a prime of length approximately l.
We say that ðt; Þ-CDH assumption holds in G if there is no adversary A that runs within time t and solves CDH problem with probability at least .
Definition 5 (n-DHE Problem).
The n-DHE (Diffie-Hellman exponent) problem [8] is that, for every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, there exists a negligible function neglðÁÞ such that Pr½Að1 l ; g; g g ; g g 2 ; . . . ; g g n ; g g nþ2 ; . . . ; g g 2n Þ ¼ g g nþ1 neglðlÞ for all l, where g 2 R Z q , and g is the generator of a group G of order q, which is a prime of length approximately l.
We say that ðt; Þ-n-DHE assumption holds in G if there is no adversary A that runs within time t and solves the n-DHE problem with probability at least .
The following theorems show that our proposed scheme satisfies the desired security properties: Theorem 3.1. The proposed OABS scheme OABS-I is unforgeable under selective predicate attack in the random oracle model if the CDH assumption holds in G.
Proof. Please refer to the proof in Appendix A, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TPDS.2013.
t u
Beyond the unforgeability, the OABS-I also achieves attribute-signer privacy, which is described below. Proof. Please refer to the proof in Appendix B, available online. t u
Efficiency Analysis
In this section, we present the efficiency analysis of the proposed scheme. Actually, the running time of Sign is much less than that of directly computing the signature itself. In original ABS construction [27] , it requires 3 2 ðjV Ã j þ d À kÞ single-based exponentiations to generate the signature. However, since multiple exponentiations have been delivered to S-CSP, in OABS-I, the signing algorithm Sign simply requires three single-based exponentiations, which is independent of the attribute set V Ã to be signed. We also specify that our technique in OABS-I allows S-CSP to perform delegated signing by employing an AND gate at private key for each user. Therefore, to generate an outsourcing key, attribute authority has to compute jVj þ d þ 1 exponentiations in G, which is linear with the size of request attribute set V. Fortunately, in practical, the generation is allowed to be performed once for all. After obtaining private key and outsourcing key from authority, user is able to (delegated) sign any message with it. Such amortized computation cost of generating the outsourcing key is rather low cost. Moreover, we consider a scenario that user has limited computation and storage ability. In this case, the outsourcing key can be firstly generated by authority and sent to S-CSP. Therefore, user only needs to store a small-sized component ðd u0 ; d u1 Þ locally but still maintaining signing capability.
Furthermore, concerning on the communication complexity for OABS-I, in outsourced signing phase, the signer has to send a signature generation request to S-CSP and receives jVj þ d À k þ 2 elements of G from it. In general, an element in G is set to be 160-bit long for 2 80 security. Thus, the additional data transferred between S-CSP and signer is tens of KBs at most, which can be processed efficiently.
THE SECOND CONSTRUCTION OABS-II
The Proposed Scheme
Our second OABS scheme OABS-II is based on Herranz et al.'s construction [25] . The main advantage over the first one is that signature length is much shorter (the signature only consists of three group elements). Actually, in Herranz et al.'s original construction [25] , the computational cost of signing algorithm is much heavy for users with limited computational ability. Nevertheless, after utilizing our outsourcing technique, the complexity in signing phase is reduced to constant exponentiations. We provide the OABS-II as follows:
Setupð; U; dÞ: Similar to the Setup algorithm in OABS-I, define the universe U, the ðd À 1Þ-element dummy attribute setV and the default attribute u in Z q . Choose h; h i 2 R G for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 2d þ 1 and u 0 ; u 1 ; . . . ; u w 2 R G as Waters' hash function [36] , where w is size limits predefined. For simplicity, the Waters hash function will be denoted by H : f0; 1g Ã ! G in our construction. Finally, after picking x; x 0 2 R Z q , it outputs the public key PK ¼ ðeðg; gÞ x ; h ¼ g x 0 ; fh i g 2dþ1 i¼1 ; HÞ and stores the master key MK ¼ x. KeyGenðMK; VÞ: For each user's private key request on attribute set V, select x 1 2 R Z q and define an implicit value x 2 ¼ x À x 1 . Randomly select an implicit ðd À 1Þ-degree polynomial qðzÞ 
are able to be defined as the coefficients of the polynomial below.
where c dþ3 ; c dþ4 ; . . . ; c 2dþ1 are all set to 0. -Pick r 2 R Z q and compute 
If the above equation holds, the signature s on M with Ç k;V Ã is valid and accepted; otherwise, it is rejected. Obviously, in Herranz el al's original construction [25] , the signing phase requires Oðd 2 Þ single-based exponentiations, but utilizing our technique, such cost is reduced to OðdÞ exponentiations.
Security Analysis
Before justifying the correctness of the verification, we specify that for each i 2 V 0 [V 0 [ fug, the equation below
holds based on the fact that pðiÞ ¼ 0. Therefore, the correctness is examined as follows. Proof. Please refer to the proof in Appendix C, available online. t u Theorem 4.2. The proposed scheme enjoys attribute-signer privacy.
Proof. Please refer to the proof in Appendix D, available online. t u
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we provide a thorough experimental evaluation of the proposed outsourcing algorithms and cryptographic schemes. Our experiment is simulated on a LINUX machine with Intel Core 2 processors running at 2.40 Gez and 2 G memory. Throughout this experiment, to precisely evaluate the computation complexity at both signer and S-CSP sides, we make this LINUX machine simulate the both entities. In this case, it is easy to distinguish the overhead at the delegator (i.e., the signer) and worker (i.e., the S-CSP) from time cost.
Experimental Results for OABS-I
In Fig. 1(a) , we show the efficiency comparison for the setup phase between OABS-I and ABS-I. In this evaluation, we fix the threshold d ¼ 8 and 16 respectively, and vary the number of attributes in the universe from 60 to 100. Theoretically, the proposed scheme OABS-I requires a little more time than the original one ABS-I. More specifically, compared with the original scheme ABS-I, our construction requires an additional initialization for a default attribute u for facilitating outsourcing. However, we have to point out that the additional time is negligible in the case of a large universe. Though the figure, we can deduce that the schemes OABS-I and ABS-I have the same computational complexity in the Setup phase (note that the two curves almost overlap with each other). Fig. 1b illustrates the efficiency comparison in the KeyGen phase between two schemes. It is not surprising to see that OABS-I also requires (very) little more time than ABS-I. This is because the attribute authority has to additionally issue private keys for the new introduced default attribute u, involving nearly two exponentiations. Similarly, the additional time is negligible in the case of a large universe. Therefore, the two schemes have almost the same computational complexity in the KeyGen phase.
The performance of signing phase in both OABS-I and ABS-I is shown in Fig. 1c . Note that in this experiment, we assume that signer has been assigned with the attribute private key for all the attributes in the universe U of size 100, and randomly pick jV Ã j attributes from U to prove that he/ she has at least d attributes of V Ã (i.e., the signing predicate is Ç d;V Ã ), where d is the threshold value. The efficiency in Fig. 1c is evaluated in several cases for jV Ã j ¼ 20; 40; 60 and d ¼ 8; 16, respectively. It is clear that OABS-I is overall slightly expensive regarding to computation and communication complexity because we consider the issue of secure outsourcing. Specifically, compared with ABS-I, our scheme supports private delegation, which sacrifices slight efficiency (e.g., some computations involving the default attribute u) for preserving the privacy of signer and his/her signing key. However, concerning on the local computation performed by the signer, our scheme OABS-I achieves much nearly constant performance compared with the linear increasing efficiency of ABS-I. This advantage allows our scheme to be applied for the resource-constraint devices to complete the task of ABS. Table 1 shows the time cost for the verifying phase in OABS-I and ABS-I (values in parentheses are the time cost for ABS-I, while the other is for OABS-I). Actually, our scheme OABS demands additional verifying operations (nearly one pairing operation) for the default attribute u. This makes the verification of our scheme is slightly slower than that of the original scheme. Moreover, we observe the efficiency in both OABS-I and ABS-I is independent with the threshold value d, because we generate the experimental signature for verification in the same manner with the signing phase, which only embeds the signer's attributes and will not involve the dummy attributes.
Experimental Results for OABS-II
As with the same assumption in the evaluation of OABS-I, we also evaluate the efficiency of OABS-II and compare it with that of original scheme ABS-II. Actually, both schemes share almost the same computational complexity in this phase, leading to the similar efficiency presentation. But unlike the same phase in OABS-I and ABS-I, the efficiency in setup phase of OABS-II and ABS-II is mainly depended on the threshold value d because the setup algorithm does not need to initialize a group element for each attribute in the universe. As a result, the setup in OABS-II is more efficient than that in OABS-I for small d.
The efficiency curve in Fig. 2b for OABS-II and ABS-II shows a similar shape to that in the previous experiment for OABS-I and ABS-I. But unlike the first scheme that only needs two exponentiations in order to generate private key component for a single attribute, the attribute authority in the second scheme has to compute ð2d þ 2Þ elements in G for each attribute, leading to the intensive complexity in this phase.
Similarly, in the signing phase (the efficiency is shown in Fig. 2c , OABS-II is slower than ABS-II in overall performance, but has a much more efficient in local performance. Furthermore, we have to point out that unlike a linear efficiency (linear with both V and d) in the first scheme, the time cost of signing in original scheme ABS-II is linear with d 2 (i.e., Oðd 2 Þ). Due to our outsourcing technique, the local computation in OABS-II is now reduced to OðdÞ.
The experimental results of the verifying phase for our second scheme are shown in Table 2 (values in parentheses are the time cost for ABS-II, while the other is for OABS-II). It is clear that OABS-II and ABS-II share an identical efficiency in this phase, which is just depended on the threshold d in predicate (note that the predicate used is Ç d;V Ã as with the assumption in the evaluation of the first scheme).
OABS WITH S-CSP ACCOUNTABILITY
In this section, we show how to extend OABS with the additional property of S-CSP accountability.
In a practical OABS system, the S-CSP cannot be fully trusted. Thus, how to guarantee the correctness of the result from the S-CSP is critical. The trivial technique is to verify the outsourced signature with the normal verification algorithm in ABS. However, the computational cost of such verification is a large number of bilinear pairings and exponentiations [25] , [27] , which grows linearly with the number of attributes in the predicate. As a result, the computation overhead at signer side will not be reduced at all even after outsourcing. To tackle this challenge, an additional security requirement of accountability is introduced into OABS. Specifically, it requires that any dishonest action and result returned by S-CSP can be detected and traced. Such dishonest behaves could be prevented to a great extent if S-CSP will be punished if detected. The accountable OABS can be utilized to applications such as fine-grained private access control or distributed access control for ad hoc networks etc. When an access request (that is, an OABS) fails, user is allowed to launch another request of access by sending another correct signature. Its definition is provided as follows.
Definition 6 (Accountability). An outsourced ABS scheme OABS satisfies accountability if S-CSP involved in is accountable for its dishonest actions, that is, it can be detected and traced if S-CSP has not generate the outsourcing signatures correctly.
We show how to achieve S-CSP accountability based on OABS-I which is defined in Section 4.1. Actually, the technique can be easily applied to OABS-II as well. In the accountable OABS scheme, we require that S-CSP must have a key pair for generating signature with ordinary digital signature scheme SIG ¼ ðKS; SIG; VERÞ, where KS; SIG, and VER denote setup algorithm, signing algorithm and verifying algorithm, respectively. The accountable OABS construction is identical to OABS-I in Section 4.1, except that the Sign out algorithm. 2 Furthermore, an additional algorithm Trace is also involved to realize the accountability of S-CSP. We present the intuition of the accountable OABS as follows: After complete the outsourcing ABS signature s 0 ¼ ðs 0 0 ; fs 0 i g i2V Ã [V 0 Þ on behalf of user, the S-CSP is required to embed its own signature as a tag (denoted by tag) on each concatenation of outsourcing key OK and the corresponding generated signature s 0 . The original signer only needs to verify the ordinary signature signed by S-CSP, instead of verifying the signature s 0 of OABS. Then, if the ABS signature fails in verification later, the signer is able to utilize such an "evidence" to trace and confirm whether S-CSP produced the invalid signature or not. We only describe the Trace algorithm for simplicity. If the above equation does not hold, it further verifies the correctness of OK by running Sign out algorithm to get an outsourced signatures and verifyings using the method described in the above equation. If holds, it means that S-CSP misbehaves. Otherwise, the arbitration agency can deduce that the original signer misbehaves.
CONCLUSION
Aiming at eliminating the most computational overhead at signer, we introduce outsourcing computation into ABS and propose two efficient OABS schemes. With the help of C-CSP, our first scheme requires only three exponentiations for signing a single message at signer side. Our second scheme is built on Herranz et al.'s work [25] , but reduces the number of exponentiations from Oðd 2 Þ to OðdÞ, where d is the upper bound of the threshold value. Furthermore, the communication overhead between the signer and S-CSP is very low which requires only three group elements. We discuss the extensions for OABS including accountability and show practical solutions as well.
